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Institutional theory has largely ignored the institutional diffusion
across borders although it is a common phenomenon in this
interconnected world. We examined the influence of the MNC on
institutional diffusion in emerging markets. In a research setting of
hiring the disabled in Korea, hypotheses were tested with a sample of
948 firms including 101 MNC subsidiaries. Results support the
propositions that MNC subsidiaries from major advanced economies
hire more disabled workers, and this tendency is diffused to subsidiaries
from other countries in Korea. However, we failed to find the evidence
that MNC subsidiaries exert isomorphic pressures to local players.
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INTRODUCTION
During last decades, institutional theory has gained its own
legitimacy among researchers of various disciplines such as
sociology (e.g., Mizruchi and Fein 1999), organizational theory
(e.g., Baum and Oliver 1991) and strategic management (e.g.
Hoskisson et al. 2000). One of the main themes of the theory is
the diffusion process of a new institution. Exploring why and
how an institution diffuses within an organizational field is the
main focus of many studies (e.g., Guler, Guillén, and
Macpherson 2002; Zucker 1987). 
Institutional theory argues that a firm’s adoption of a practice
is influenced by the institutional environment surrounding the
firm (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977). Since
many factors of the institutional environment, such as culture
and legal systems, are often specific to a nation, organizational
practices can be expected to vary across countries (Kostova and
Roth 2002). Therefore it is the reasonable direction from the
theory that studies have been concentrated on showing and
explaining “similarities in firms’ practices within a national
border” and “dissimilarities in firms’ practices across national
borders”. 
Although the theory made a huge contribution for these
research areas, it still has opportunities for expansion. By posing
too much focus on dissimilarities in firms’ behaviors across
national borders, it has missed growing similarities in firms’
behaviors across nations. This happens partly because the
organizational field where an institutional diffusion occurs is too
narrowly defined (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Although
some researchers have argued that the concept of organizational
field should be extended beyond national borders (Westney
1993), the studies on the global diffusion are still rare (few
exceptions include Guler, Guillén, and Macpherson 2002;
Kostova and Roth 2002). The lack of the studies is particularly
remarkable because, in reality, the world has been rapidly
interconnected and isomorphic behaviors among the firms
beyond national borders are everywhere (Westney 1993). The
purpose of this study is to contribute to the theory by filling this
void. 
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In order for the theory to be globally extended, it is necessary
to explore new sources of institutional diffusion beyond
traditional ones such as nation-states and professionals
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In this paper, we argue that
multinational corporations (MNC) may play a significant role in
institutional diffusion across borders. Since an MNC subsidiary
confronts institutional pressures from both the headquarter and
other sister subsidiaries, it may adopt practices institutionalized
within the interorganizational network (Ghoshal and Bartlett
1990) rather than within the host country. This tendency will be
higher when the subsidiary faces high uncertainty in the host
country environment, usually linked to multiple, conflicting
constituent pressures (Goodrick and Salancik 1996; Oliver
1991). 
In this paper, we examine the corporate social responsibility
(CSR) in an emerging market, South Korea. This research setting
provides a unique opportunity to test our argument for two
reasons. First, since the practice of CSR is only in its semi-
institutionalized stage in Korea, both firms’ responses and
institutional pressures show diversity. CSR has gained special
attention since far back in the 1960s in the economically
advanced world including the U.S. (Cochran and Wood 1984;
Freeman 1984; Vogel 1986) and Europe (Preston, Rey, and
Dierkes 1978), and became the biggest corporate fad of the
1990s and the 2000s (Carroll 2004). In emerging markets
including Korea, however, such an institution has not yet been
strongly established (Amba-Rao 1993). Since these countries
often seek both economic growth and social justice
simultaneously, organizations often confront multiple conflicting
pressures from institutional constituents, which gives more
discretion to organizations within the countries and thus causes
more diversity (Goodrick and Salancik 1996). This situation of
high diversity in both institutional pressures and firms’
conformity helps us observe the dynamics among various
institutional actors and firms’ responses (Powell and DiMaggio
1991). 
Second, CSR is a practice that is less directly related to
technical efficiency (Meyer and Rowan 1977). In international
business field, transfers of practices to subsidiaries are not new
and have been frequently discussed. The main argument of this
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stream is that in order to overcome liability of foreignness and
gain competitive advantage over local firms, the MNC should
transfer its strategic organizational practices to subsidiaries
(Hymer 1976; Kostova 1999; Zaheer 1995). Strategic
organizational practices include supplier integration, continuous
improvement, and total quality management to name a few
(Kostova 1999). However, examining these strategic practices in
order to explain institutional isomorphism within an MNC
network is somewhat difficult because a subsidiary’s adoption of
strategic practices may result from mixed roles of competitive
and institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In this
sense, CSR may be one of the practices that firms adopt more for
institutional legitimacy rather than for economic fitness, which
shows the effects of institutional pressures more clearly. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
A Case of Hiring the Disabled in Korea: A Semi-Institutionalization Stage
In this paper, we narrow our attention to the workplace
representation among many issues of CSR. Specifically, we
examine institutional pressures for hiring individuals with
disabilities in Korea. This practice is chosen because it is in its
early stage of diffusion or in its semi-institutionalization stage in
Korea (Zucker 1987). In semi-institutionalization stage,
according to Tolbert and Zucker (1996), a practice is fairly
diffused and has gained some degree of normative acceptance,
but it has a relatively short history. Since it is not yet permanent
and stable, managers may exercise a significant discretion on the
choice of adoption, which gives researchers a unique opportunity
to examine the roles of various institutional pressures during
institutional diffusion. 
In Korea, the awareness of disability has increased only from
the late 1980s when the Seoul Paralympics were held in 1988.
This increasing awareness ended in a period of active and rapid
policy making in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s.
Within the short period of 15 years, all kinds of new disability
related programs were introduced; a disability registration
system in 1989, anti-discrimination regulations and an
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employment quota scheme in 1990, employment promotion and
vocational rehabilitation in 2000 (OECD 2003). 
Korean government has been applying a mandatory
employment quota scheme that was first introduced in 1990;
every private and public employer with more than 300 employees
should provide work for people with disabilities for at least 2% of
their total employees.1 However, only one in six employers
fulfilled entire quota, and only 46% in private sector and 72% in
public sector were fulfilled in 1999 (OECD 2003). Although the
numbers continuously increased to 56% in private and 80% in
public by 2001, they were still much lower than other developed
countries. For example, in Japan, an economically developed
country having a similar quota scheme, 83% in private sector
and more than 100% in public sector were fulfilled in 2001. In
France, although the quota is 6%, a three-time higher quota to
the firms with more than only 19 employees, 67% of all quota
places were filled and four in ten employers fulfilled the entire
quota in the same period (OECD 2003).
This happens partly because the government lacks required
resources and capabilities to enforce the policy effectively. For
example, although it is a necessary condition to educate and
train people with disabilities in order to enhance their
employability, the government simply cannot afford it. The public
expenditure on disability-related programs as a percentage of
GDP in Korea is lowest among the OECD countries; it is only
0.29% while OECD average is 2.42% (OECD 2003). 
Another reason is that hiring people with disabilities has not
gained strong legitimacy from major constituents of the society
yet. Although the laws are established, the economic-growth
mentality has been obsessing government officials, firm
managers and the general public, which impedes the
institutionalization of the practice. Preoccupied with economic
development, the government maintained close relationship with
business but not with other constituents of the society during
the developmental period from the 1960s to the 70s (Shin 2000).
Policy makers of consecutive regimes also set economic growth
as the fundamental goal and pursued a coherent strategy to
achieve it, which caused explicit subordination of social policy to
The Influence of Multinational Corporations on Institutional Diffusion in ~ 7
1) The quota changed from 1% in 1990 and 1.6% in 1992 to 2% in 1993. And
the policy was extended to the firms with more than 50 employees in 2004.
economic policy and economic growth (Shin and Shaw 2003). 
The general public in Korea was excited at the remarkable
economic growth of the nation often expressed as “The Miracle of
the Han River”, and favorable to the aggressive growth strategy of
Korean firms. Reflecting normative expectations of the society,
the predominant goal of Korean firms was growth (Scott 1995).
Incorporating the government’s policies aimed at economic
development was considered as firms’ primary responsibility for
the society. By contributing to the economic growth of the
nation, Korean firms were able to gain their strong legitimacy
from the society. 
This economic-growth-first climate of the society is still
discouraging advocates of welfare state from raising social issues
such as civil rights and working conditions. Since hiring persons
with disabilities is believed to increase costs, to decrease Korean
firms’ global competitiveness and, ultimately, to endanger the
nation’s economic prosperity, the practice has not been strongly
supported by the institutional context in Korea. As a result, the
enforcement of the laws regarding employment of the disabled
has been relatively weak. First, large exemptions are granted to
many industries. For example, 85% of obligation is exempted in
fishery industry and 75% in transportation industry. The average
exemption rate in every industry reaches 22% of the entire quota
in private sector and 69% in public sector (Korea Labor Institute
2003). Second, formal sanctions, not to mention informal
sanctions from the public, are weak. The levy on under-
fulfillment has only been 65~75% of minimum wage; about $300
per month for each place not filled (OECD 2003). This levy is
believed much less than the additional costs caused by hiring
disabled workers. Accommodating and training people with
disabilities and productivity loss are largely considered to cost
much more than the levy for employers. 
In conclusion, the practice of hiring people with disabilities has
gained some normative acceptance, but it has failed to gain
strong legitimacy from the constituents of the society, and
therefore, adopting the practice is largely regarded as
discretionary for Korean managers. As a result, only three out of
thirty largest Korean business groups were hiring more than 2%
of disabled workers in 2003. 
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The Multinational Corporation: A Source of Institutional Diffusion across
Borders 
Studies in institutional theory have often been concentrated on
showing and explaining dissimilarities in firms’ practices across
national borders. Orrù, Biggart, and Hamilton (1991) found that
enterprise groups in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan display
distinctive patterns of ownership, management, finance, and
production while uniform patterns within each country due to
their legitimacy seeking behaviors. Similarly, comparing auto
industries in Korea, Taiwan, Spain, and Argentina, Biggart and
Guillén (1999) argued that although the four countries held a
common aim and employed similar policies, their development
patterns differed dramatically because of the difference in
institutional arrangements. This research stream, together with
single country studies (e.g., Carroll, Goodstein, and Gyenes
1988; Lee and Pennings 2002), emphasizes the endogenous facet
of institutionalization (Westney 1993). 
More recently, however, growing attention is being paid to
“similarities in firms’ practices across national borders”. This
research stream suggests that institutional theory should be
more developed to explain organizations’ isomorphic behaviors in
a global scale that are becoming more and more common. The
researchers of this stream focus on exogenous facet of
institutionalization (Guler, Guillén, and Macpherson 2002; Meyer
et al. 1997; Westney 1993). Westney (1993) pointed out that the
concept of organizational field in institutional theory should be
widened to cross national borders because of the emergence of
global industries since the 1970s. In a global industry, rivals
compete against each other on a truly worldwide basis. They
share the recognition of competitors from several countries that
they are, in fact, global competitors operating in the same space.
Therefore, they benchmark each other no matter what their
home countries are and, sometimes, no matter what their
industries are (Westney 1993). Along with the changes in
competitive environments, institutional agencies such as the
electric and print media, educational institutions, professional
accreditation, and consulting firms are increasingly spanning
borders in a variety of ways to foster the spread of organizational
practices worldwide (Rosenzweig and Singh 1991). 
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Some researchers have recently recognized the multinational
corporation as a possible source of institutional isomorphism
across national borders while institutional theorists have largely
ignored its roles (Rosenzweig and Singh 1991; Westney 1993).
Westney (1993: 74), for example, pointed out that MNC
subsidiaries in some countries play a major role in establishing
what Meyer and Rowan (1977) called ‘the building blocks of
organization’. She argued that the dominance of foreign-owned
subsidiaries in Canada and Australia was the major influence on
the institutionalization of patterns of organization and
expenditure in R&D, so that local firms followed patterns
institutionalized by the MNC subsidiaries. Rosenzweig and Singh
(1991: 354) took another example. Opening a luxury hotel in
Hong Kong, Marriott hired employees to work a five-day
workweek, challenging the local norm of a six-day workweek. The
corporation was following the labor practices it uses everywhere
in the world, except Saudi Arabia, where the five-day workweek
is prohibited by law. Despite punitive efforts by local firms, Hong
Kong’s prevailing management practices and perceptions of
appropriate human resource management were likely to be
changed by the introduction of practices from an American
company’s foreign subsidiary. Similarly, Langlois and
Schlegelmilch (1990) asserted that writing codes of ethics is an
essentially American practice, and has made its way to Europe
via the subsidiaries of U.S. firms.
The MNC has dual characteristics. On the one hand, an MNC
can be viewed as a group of autonomous subunits facing different
institutional pressures from various nation-specific
environments (Jarillo and Martinez 1990; Taggart 1998). Each
subunit — subsidiary — operates within a different national
border, and faces different institutional environment from
subunits in other countries. In this situation, institutional
theory, in general, may predict that each subunit should follow
different institutional rules specified by the national environment
in which it operates in order to gain external legitimacy, and
therefore, should be identical with local firms (Kostova and
Zaheer 1999; Westney 1993). On the other hand, an MNC can be
viewed as a unitary organization (Ghoshal and Westney 1993;
Rosenzweig and Singh 1991; Sundaram and Black 1992),
sharing a same objective and hierarchical order. Organization-as-
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institution approach of institutional theory (Zucker 1977, 1983),
although it does not specifically mention the MNC, suggests that
institutional elements of subunits can arise from within the
organization itself as well as from other organizations. These
institutional elements — structures, policies and practices ? are
more easily transmitted to newcomers and new subunits than
those embedded in alternative social coordination structures, are
maintained over a long period of time without further
justification or elaboration, and are highly resistant to change
(Zucker 1977, 1983). The resulting stability increases
effectiveness when it is linked to goals of the organization by
creating “routines” that reduce search and evaluation costs
(Zucker 1987: 446). 
Based on the definition of the MNC as a internally
differentiated interorganizational network (Ghoshal and Bartlett
1990), which has both characteristics simultaneously, a recent
research stream, narrowly focused on MNCs, argues that an
MNC forms micro-institutional environment to the subunits
within its boundary regardless of their host countries, and this
micro-institutional environment exerts the institutional pressure
to those subunits (e.g., Davis, Desai, and Francis 2000; Kostova
and Zaheer 1999; Yiu and Makino 2002). Following this stream,
we may argue that a subsidiary of an MNC is under coercive,
mimetic and normative pressures to be isomorphic with the
parent and sister subsidiaries in regard to its organizational
practices. 
First, the MNC headquarter exerts coercive pressures to
subsidiaries to be isomorphic with the parent and sister
subsidiaries either to transfer its competitive advantage (Kostova
1999; Rosenzweig and Singh 1991; Zaheer 1995) or to coordinate
its subsidiaries (Doz and Prahalad 1984). The MNC headquarter
sometimes exercises its formal authority to subsidiaries
operating in various countries to adopt its specific organizational
practices for strategic purposes. This transfer is critical for an
MNC’s success because the primary advantage that a
multinational firm brings to foreign markets where it faces
liability foreignness is the superior organizational capabilities
that can be utilized in its subsidiaries worldwide. Therefore, this
issue has been one of the main topics among researchers in
international business (e.g., Kogut 1991; Kostova 1999). 
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Forceful adoptions of organizational practices by MNC
subsidiaries may also result from control and coordinating
demands of MNCs. In MNCs, although coordinating their
subunits is more troublesome than in purely domestic firms due
to the physical, cultural, and political distances that are
generally involved in the crossing of sovereign borders, the
importance of coordination is not less than domestic
organizations (e.g., Doz and Prahalad 1984; Martinez and Jarillo
1989). Therefore, they actively adopt control devices suggested in
organization theory. For example, they use centralization,
formalization, and socialization as means of coordination
(Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989). These coordinating efforts are often
accompanied with transferring a parent practices to subsidiaries.
Headquarters may specify subsidiaries’ internal financial
reporting systems for consistent evaluation and efficient resource
allocation (Rosenzweig and Singh 1991) and human resource
management practices for internal equity (Rosenzweig and
Nohria 1994). 
Second, the parent and each subsidiary of an MNC face
mimetic pressures for conformity due to high uncertainty
(Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1989). When establishing a new
subsidiary in a new country, managers of the parent unit face
higher uncertainty resulting from lack of necessary information
and experiences than local mangers (Guillén 2002). In this
situation, they have a high incentive to replicate the practices of
the parent and other subsidiaries within the MNC to overcome
the uncertainty (Lubatkin et al. 1998). This incentive toward
mimicry exists within subsidiary managers as well. Subsidiary
managers, even after their subsidiary is fairly well established,
face uncertainty while managing operations. The uncertainty will
be even higher if they are expatriates who are new to the host
environment. In this instance, subsidiary managers may prefer
to replicate the practices of the parent or sister subsidiaries
within the MNC because they are convenient sources of reference
that the subsidiary can use, and also because managers can
enhance internal legitimacy by adopting them (Kostova and
Zaheer 1999). 
Third, managers in both the parent and subsidiaries may find
themselves under normative pressures for conformity within the
MNC network. MNC headquarters intentionally adopt
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socialization as an effective coordinating device (Bartlett and
Ghoshal 1989; Edström and Galbraith 1977). Socialization relies
on shared norms and values among the dominant coalition of
decision-making in both the parent and subsidiaries. This is
especially effective when the difference among various countries
in which subsidiaries operate is great, so both centralization and
formalization are difficult to implement (Sundaram and Black
1992). To build common norms and values, a strong emphasis is
placed on selection, training and acculturations of key decision
makers, and extensive and open communication among
managers in headquarters and subsidiaries (Bartlett and
Ghoshal 1989; Martinez and Jarillo 1989). 
In addition, socialization efforts often involve extensive
transfers of managers and frequent personal contacts among
managers through corporate meetings, conferences, management
trips and personal visits that all contribute to creation of a
“informal network” among managers in various nations
regardless of the intention of the headquarter (Edström and
Galbraith 1977; Martinez and Jarillo 1989). Norms and values
may be institutionalized and transmitted as part of objective
reality among the members of the network. In this case, no
external motivation for conformity is necessary because the actor
is internally motivated to do what he has to do (Zucker 1977). 
However, transfer of practices and procedures within the MNC
network may be constrained by host country environments. Each
country has its own legitimacy requirements. If the legitimacy
requirement in the host country is formalized by laws, rules and
regulations and strongly enforced, it acts as coercive pressures
for conformity to subsidiaries of other nationals. Becoming
isomorphic to the institutional rule of the host country
regardless of internal legitimacy means just obeying the law.
However, when the institutional requirement of the host country
is less clear and/or weakly enforced, which is common in
emerging markets and which is the case of this paper, subsidiary
managers may enjoy considerable discretions (Goodrick and
Salancik 1996). This situation makes managers easy to follow
the institutional norms of the MNC network rather than to follow
them of the host country. 
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The MNC and Hiring the Disabled in Korea
Unlike emerging markets, corporate social responsibility is well
institutionalized to the constituents of societies in major
advanced economies. Although firms have adopted various
policies, it now seems clear that managers in the regions such as
the U.S., Europe and Japan, in common, regard social
responsibility of business as a strong institutional rule they
should conform to (Preston, Rey, and Dierkes 1978; Sturdivant
and Ginter 1977). Interest groups and public awareness on
social issues have risen (Freeman 1984), nation-states have
eagerly protected interests of stakeholders by legislating and
strongly enforcing laws and policies (Donaldson and Preston
1995), and professional associations and business schools have
legitimated and diffused many practices of CSR since as early as
the 1960s (Donaldson 2003). CSR has been further legitimized as
firm managers accept the supposition that actively pursuing CSR
is a rationally effective and efficient mean for economic goals
(Meyer and Rowan 1977); that is, a positive relationship between
CSR and financial performance (e.g., Cornell and Shapiro 1987;
McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis 1988). 
Institutional elements tend to be imprinted by the institutional
environment under which the organization was originally
founded (Kogut 1993). Since CSR is strongly legitimated in major
advanced economies, the MNC from those regions may have the
institutional elements in the form of cultures, structures, or
routines within its own system (Scott 1995) and transfer them to
its subunits in other countries both intentionally and habitually.
In addition, facing uncertainty and lack of knowledge resulting
from entering a new market, the MNC may try to learn from
other’s experience as well as from its own experience so as to
cope with uncertainty. During this process, MNCs tend to imitate
actions of other MNCs that are, they believe, primary reference
points. Firms regarded as a primary reference point to a firm
tend to be those who have relevant history, experience, or
location to its own predicament. This tendency generates
mimetic isomorphism among MNC subsidiaries from a same
home country operating within a same host country (Guillén
2002).
Additionally, in respect to CSR, the MNC from major advanced
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economies may prefer to conform to the home country’s norms
since its foreign operations are closely monitored and evaluated
by the home country’s stakeholders. Now, ignoring them can
cause a reputation crisis back in its home country as well as in
its host countries (i.e., Nike’s crisis during the 1980s). As the
existing interest groups are getting more and more global and
many of new global interest groups are emerging, this reputation
issue is gaining more strategic importance for MNCs from major
advanced economies (Sethi 2002; Smith 2003). 
H1: Subsidiaries of MNCs from major advanced economies
will hire more disabled workers than MNC subsidiaries from
other economies and domestic firms in Korea. 
Subsidiary managers have isomorphic pressures from the
subsidiaries of other MNCs regardless of their home countries as
well. First, similarity produces a rapid diffusion because
organizations tend to model themselves after similar
organizations in their field that they perceive to be more
legitimate or successful (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Since
subsidiary managers may perceive that they are in structurally
equivalent positions — that is, similar in relations to other
population members (i.e., the state, the public and other
domestic firms), diffusion of a practice among MNC subsidiary
managers may be faster than between MNC subsidiary and
domestic firm managers (Strang and Meyer 1994). 
Second, subsidiary managers may not only feel similar but also
be connected. For example, Korea Foreign Company Association
(FORCA), founded in 1977, is an association of MNC subsidiaries
in Korea, and has more than 1,500 membership companies.
FORCA speaks for foreign companies to domestic business and
government, and organizes managers into Business Clubs by
industry. It also surveys, analyzes and diffuses the information
concerning activities of MNC subsidiaries and changes in
domestic environments, and develops codes of conduct for its
member companies. Given similarity and connectedness,
institutional pressures for mimicry among MNC subsidiaries may
be stronger than them between MNC subsidiaries and domestic
firms (Strang and Meyer 1994). 
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H2: MNC subsidiaries, regardless of their home countries,
will hire more disabled workers than domestic firms in Korea. 
Since multinational corporations are becoming a strong
presence, highly visible to the public, government and domestic
firms in emerging markets (Carroll 2004; Sethi 2002), and their
practices are frequently seen as advanced and highly rationalized
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983), isomorphic pressures to local
players are generated. In this sense, multinational corporations
can be one of the major sources of isomorphism across borders
in emerging markets. 
However, this isomorphic pressure from the MNC subsidiaries
is not equally strong to every domestic firm. Since institutional
theory posits that a reference group for mimicry involves the
actors perceived to be peers by the focal actor, a number of
empirical studies of institutional isomorphism have drawn the
boundaries of the social system by reference to similarity in
terms of organizational characteristics such as size, age,
membership in the same industry, and geographic region. The
implicit or explicit assumption of these studies is that members
sharing similar traits are aware of each other’s activities and use
this information to compare their practices with others (Fligstein
1991; Guler, Guillén, and Macpherson 2002; Haveman 1993).
When more organizations adopt norms and practices, that is,
when there are more MNC subsidiaries in an industry, the norms
and practices are increasingly legitimated throughout the
industry (Fligstein 1991; Tolbert and Zucker 1983). As norms
diffuse more throughout a given sector, an organization in the
sector is under the stronger pressures to follow them for both
institutional and competitive reasons; minimizing the risk of
losing legitimacy, product markets, or sources of supply (Guler,
Guillén, and Macpherson 2002). And this tendency can be
particularly strong among the firms in a same industry.
H3: A domestic firm in an industry where the dominance of
MNC subsidiaries is higher will hire more disabled workers. 
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METHODS
Data Sources
This research uses the data from Enterprise Panel Survey
carried out by the Korea Labor Institute (KLI) in 2004. The
survey, conducted by the institute since 2002, is designed to
collect the data about firms’ practices of human resource
management and industrial relations. The questionnaire consists
of the items covering a focal firm’s financial information,
business environment, strategy, organizational structure, human
resource management and industrial relation policy. In 2004, the
information of 2,004 firms, a sample deliberately designed to
represent the whole population by size and industry, was
collected between April and June. 
The other data source used in this study is the directory of
foreign invested companies available online at the website of
Korea Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy. According to
Korean laws, every foreign direct investment (FDI) should be
reported to the ministry. The foreign direct investment refers to
(1) owning more than 10% of voting stocks or (2) making
agreements about appointing officers, providing technology,
supplying materials, or purchasing products in order to
participate in management (Invest Korea 2005). Based on the
reports submitted by foreign nationals or firms, the ministry
discloses rich information regarding FDI activities in Korea, one
of which is the directory of foreign invested companies. By
comparing the company names of respondents and them in the
directory, we created two independent variables; “Subsidiary”
and “MAC Subsidiary”. 
Dependent and Independent Variables 
The dependent variable of this study is “Additional Disabled”
that is measured by subtracting the government-mandated quota
from the actual number of disabled employees. The Korean
government mandates every private and public employer with
more than 50 employees to hire people with disabilities more
than 2% of their total employees. However, the government
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allows large exemptions to employers based on industry
circumstances. The exemption rate of some industries reaches
85%, and the average is 22% in private sectors and 69% in
public sectors (Korea Labor Institute 2003). Therefore, the
government-mandated quota is calculated by multiplying 2% of
total employees by (1-industry exemption rate).
Three independent variables were added to the empirical
model; “Subsidiary”, “MAC Subsidiary” and “MNC Dominance”.
“Subsidiary” is a dummy variable; “1” for an MNC subsidiary,
and “0” otherwise. We refer the MNC subsidiary to the foreign
invested company defined by Korea Ministry of Commerce,
Industry and Energy because this definition clearly separates the
FDI from the international portfolio investment. Foreign
national’s participation in business decision making is required
to be a foreign invested company by the definition. “MAC
Subsidiary” is also a dummy variable; “1” is given to the MNC
subsidiary from major advanced countries, and “0” otherwise. We
adopted the definition of major advanced economies from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). According to the IMF,
countries are divided into three large groups of advanced
economies, developing countries and countries in transition.
Among advanced economies, the 7 largest in terms of GDP are
often referred to as the Group of Seven (G-7) and collectively
distinguished as a sub group, major advanced countries (IMF
2005). G-7 countries include the United States, Japan, Germany,
France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Canada. “MNC
Dominance” is a variable measured by the percentage of MNC
subsidiaries within a 2-digit industry. 
Control Variables
We included five variables in order to control for the influences
of other major actors in institutional diffusion of the practice.
Conventional institutional theory focuses on the roles of key
actors in institutional diffusion; the nation-states, professions
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and the general public (Oliver 1991).
And it is argued that the closer ties to those actors, the more
susceptible to their influences. 
First, as consumers of goods and services, states may exert
coercive pressures by asking suppliers and contractors to
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conform to certain procedures and standards (Guler, Guillén,
and Macpherson 2002). Since coercive pressures from the state
may be stronger when a firm’s dependence on the state
increases, firms with a revenue structure more dependent on the
state may tend to incorporate the state’s requirements more
eagerly (Edelman 1990; Oliver 1991). Therefore, we controlled for
the portion (%) of revenues from public sectors by creating a
variable, “Public Revenue”. Second, another key actor of
institutional diffusion is the public that has the important role of
setting and maintaining standards of acceptability (Deephouse
1996; Oliver 1991). The pressure from the public increases as
organizations are more visible to them. Since listed firms in KSE
and KOSDAQ are more exposed, they are more vulnerable to the
pressures from the public. “KSE/KOSDAQ Listing” is a dummy
variable; “1” for a listed company, and “0” otherwise. Third,
professionals such as consulting firms and various management
associations exercise their control via cognitive and normative
processes (Scott 1995). Their pressures may increase as
organizations have more relational ties to them, so we included
two control variables to our empirical models; the number of
management associations that a focal firm has membership
(“Mgt. Association”) and number of consulting projects conducted
by outside consulting firms in the past one year (“Consulting”).
Forth, benchmarking is an activity that causes mimicry among
organizations. As a firm conducts this activity more
enthusiastically, the firm becomes more similar to others.
Therefore, we controlled for this effect by adding the number of
benchmarking activities implemented in the past one year
(“Benchmarking”). 
We also included a firm’s number of total employees and ratio
of operating income to sales (%). A series of industry dummies
were also added (see table 1). 
RESULTS
A total of 2,004 firms responded to 2004 Enterprise Panel
Survey. We excluded the firms with less than 50 employees since
they have no obligation of hiring the disabled. 525 cases were
excluded by this criterion. Because other 531 cases have one or
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Table 1. Sample Firms by Industry
Code Industry based on KSIC (Korean Standard Cases
(2digit) Industrial Classification)
A. Agriculture and Forestry 4
B. Fishing 2
C. Mining and Quarrying 1
D. Manufacturing 503
15 Food Products and Beverages 44
16 Tobacco Products 3
17 Textiles, Except Sewn Wearing apparel 47
18 Sewn Wearing Apparel and Fur Articles 14
19 Tanning and Dressing of Leather; Luggage and Footwear 11
20 Wood and of Products of Wood and Cork, Except 
Furniture; Articles of Straw and Plaiting Materials 3
21 Pulp, Paper and Paper Products 15
22 Publishing, Printing and Reproduction of Recorded Media 18
23 Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel 3
24 Chemicals and Chemical Products 61
25 Rubber and Plastic Products 19
26 Other Non-metallic Mineral Products 24
27 Basic Metals 36
28 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and Furniture 28
29 Other Machinery and Equipment 34
30 Computers and Office Machinery 4
31 Electrical Machinery and Apparatuses n.e.c. 22
32 Electronic Components, Radio, Television and 
Communication Equipment and Apparatuses 53
33 Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments, 
Watches and Clocks 11
34 Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-trailers 35
35 Other Transport Equipment 7
36 Furniture; Articles n.e.c. 10
37 Recycling 1
E. Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 8
F. Construction 44
G. Wholesale and Retail Trade 56
H. Hotels and Restaurants 23
I. Transport 84
J. Post and Telecommunications 16
K. Financial Institutions and Insurance 33
L. Real Estate and Renting and Leasing 13
M. Business Activities 106
N. Public Administration and Defense 2
O. Education 0
P. Health and Social Work 21
Q. Recreational, Cultural and Personal Service Activities 22
R. Other Community, Repair and Personal Service Activities 10
S. Private Households with Employed Persons 0
T. Extra-territorial Organizations and Bodies 0
Total 948
more missing values, a sample of 948 firms including 101 MNC
subsidiaries was finally analyzed. Table 1 shows the number of
cases in the sample by industry. Among 101 MNC subsidiaries,
77 MNCs (76.2%) are from major advanced economies (G-7), and
the MNCs from Japan and the U.S. are most dominant in the
sample (53 cases). Home countries of 23 MNCs (22.8%) are
recognized as other advanced economies by the IMF
classification; 16 Euro and 7 Asian companies. Only one MNC
from a developing country, Malaysia, was included in the sample. 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics and correlations between
variables, and table 3 presents the results of the multiple
regression analysis with the dependent variable, Additional
Disabled. Model 1 only includes control variables, while in model
2 the control variables from conventional institutional
predictions are added, and model 3 and 4 include the MNC
related variables. Adjusted R2 for each model is .292, .318, .320
and .321 respectively. Finally, model 5 includes the variable,
“MNC Dominance”, and the analysis was conducted to 847
domestic firms only. 
The result of model 3 shows that hypothesis 1, proposing the
positive relationship between MNC subsidiaries from major
advanced economies and hiring the disabled workers, is
supported at the significance level of 10%. The result of model 4
presents MNC subsidiaries regardless of their home countries
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Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations (N = 948)
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Additional Disabled -1.91 20.10
2. MAC Subsidiary 0.08 0.27 .013
3. Subsidiary 0.11 0.31 .006 .861***
4. MNC Dominance 10.86 9.91 -.048 .255***.312***
5. Public Revenue 7.07 21.07 .027 -.067**-.084***-.066**
6. KSE/KOSDAQListing 0.30 0.46 -.102*** -.007 -.022 .192***-.094***
7. Mgt. Association 2.97 4.17 -.171*** .024 .033 .081** .059*.217***
8. Consulting 0.78 1.87 -.140*** .069** .096***.115*** -.037 .105***.202***
9. Benchmarking 1.07 3.05 -.178*** .060* .079** .061* -.033.101***.273***.384***
10. Number of Employee 866.34 3200.86-.513*** .021 .041 .025 -.016.197*** .061* .111***.148***
11. Operating Income 4.32 26.81 -.020 .015 .032 .060* .025 .036 .018 .012 .021 .020
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3. Results of Multiple Regression Analysis







Public Revenue .027 .030 .031 .026
(.028) (.028) (.028) (.029)
KSE/KOSDAQ 2.247* 2.410* 2.477* 2.324
Listing (1.307) (1.309) (1.310) (1.433)
Mgt. Association -.684*** -.686*** -.689*** -.738***
(.141) (.141) (.141) (.151)
Consulting -.311 -.326 -.344 -.357
(.319) (.319) (.319) (.349)
Benchmarking -.377* -.388* -.393* -.368*
(.201) (.201) (.201) (.218)
Number of Employee -.004*** -.003*** -.004*** -.004*** -.004***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Operating Income -.003 -.002 -.003 -.003 -.001
(.021) (.020) (.020) (.020) (.021)
Industry A .761 -1.365 -.941 -1.288 -.763
(8.487) (8.346) (8.352) (8.341) (9.849)
Industry B 4.069 .814 1.166 1.189 1.079
(11.978) (11.791) (11.779 (11.774) (12.062)
Industry C -1.812 -6.003 -5.866 -5.866 -5.449
(16.929) (16.786) (16.767) (16.760) (17.137)
Industry E 9.273 11.788 11.744 11.814 15.208
(6.025) (6.010)** (6.003)* (6.000)* (6.570)**
Industry F 2.789 2.156 2.566 2.606 2.282
(2.660) (2.690) (2.696) (2.695) (2.968)
Industry G 1.859 1.135 1.333 1.333 1.015
(2.383) (2.350) (2.349) (2.346) (2.562)
Industry H 1.441 2.230 2.457 2.402 2.777
(3.606) (3.626) (3.624) (3.621) (3.964)
Industry I 2.850 1.858 2.338 2.318 1.714
(1.997) (2.016) (2.031) (2.026) (2.276)
Industry J 24.656 23.073 23.543 23.408 28.278
(4.447)*** (4.379)*** (4.381)*** (4.375)*** (4.684)***
Industry K 2.323 1.525 1.889 1.847 1.903
(3.053) (3.009) (3.012) (3.008) (3.239)
hire more disabled workers than domestic firms, and thus
hypothesis 2 is also supported at the significance level of 5%.
However, hypothesis 3 that hypothesized the relationship
between MNC dominance and mimicry among domestic firms is
not supported, which will be discussed later. 
Empirical results for control variables in model 2 drawn from
conventional institutional theory and experiences of major
advanced countries are somewhat notable. While the positive
influence of the public on hiring disabled workers is supported,
the influence of the government does not appear significant. This
may reflect that the government has not been strongly exerting
coercive pressures at all. However, industry dummies
representing electricity, gas and water supply industries
(Industry E), post and telecommunications industries (Industry
J), and public administration and defense industries (Industry N)
have significant influence on hiring the disabled. These
industries are largely composed of (former) pubic owned
companies. Therefore, we can argue that although the
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Table 3. Continued
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Industry L -.904 -1.366 -1.145 -1.338 -1.194
(4.751) (4.697) (4.693) (4.689) (5.197)
Industry M -1.501 -1.309 -1.006 -1.050 -.754
(1.809) (1.860) (1.865) (1.861) (2.071)
Industry N 55.313 64.257 64.911 65.105 68.330
(12.057)***(11.964)*** (11.955)*** (11.952)*** (12.248)***
Industry P 1.164 .839 1.355 441 1.055
(3.765) (3.742) (3.749) (3.748) (3.965)
Industry Q -.382 -.408 .084 .164 -.334
(3.684) (3.642) (3.648) (3.647) (3.872)
Industry R 4.397 3.448 3.904 3.610 3.931
(5.400) (5.343) (5.342) (5.335) (5.772)
Constant .072 2.007 1.519 1.458 2.190
(.779) (1.000)** (1.036) (1.036) (1.494)
N 948 948 948 948 847
R2 .306 .335 .337 .338 .377
Adjusted R2 .292 .318 .320 .321 .359
Standard errors are in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
government does not exert coercive pressures to its suppliers
and contractors, it does to the firms it has significant ownership.
But this argument is only tentative, and more thorough
investigation about the relationship between government
ownership and hiring the disabled is required. 
The effects of management associations and benchmarking on
hiring the disabled are significant at the 1% and 10% level
respectively. This implies that a significant influence of
professional communities on firms’ behaviors regarding CSR
does exist in Korea. However, the directions are consistently
opposite to the conventional prediction. In the situation where
institutions - in this case, economic growth and social justice -
conflict each other, sanctions and incentives from the
government and the public are weak and mixed, and thus hiring
disabled workers is regarded as highly costly, business
communities, as an active actor (Oliver 1991; Powell and
DiMaggio 1991), may seek their interests rather than conform
proactively to the normative guidance from institutional
environments. This confirms the argument that norms and
institutions affect the behavior of actors by altering benefit/cost
calculations (Hechter, Opp, and Wippler 1990) and actors behave
expediently; they calculate rewards and penalties, whether these
come from other individuals, from organizations, or from the
state (Scott 1995).
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We began this research with an interest in global diffusion of
institution. Institutional theory has made an enormous
contribution to sociology, organizational theory, strategic
management and international business. However, we found that
the theory has largely overlooked the migration of institutions
across borders. Since many elements in the institutional
environment are often specific to a nation, institutional theorists
have exclusively focused on domestic diffusion of institutions. We
argued this empty space of the theory may be filled by examining
the roles of the MNC. 
The first major finding of this paper is that the MNC from
major advanced economies brings its CSR practices to emerging
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economies (hypothesis 1). An MNC network exerts coercive,
mimetic, and normative pressures to its subunits, and
subsidiaries tend to follow the rules institutionalized by their
networks and home countries either intentionally or habitually.
When institutional requirements of host countries are less clear
and weakly enforced, this tendency may be stronger. The second
fining of this paper is that mimicry among MNC subsidiaries
regardless of their home countries exists (hypothesis 2). The
reason is that, given similarity and connectedness, isomorphic
pressures among MNC subsidiaries may be stronger than them
between subsidiaries and local players. 
However, this paper has some limitations. First, this paper
does not clarify the motivation of the MNC when it hires disabled
workers. It is possible that MNCs in emerging economies hire
disable employees not because of wanting to fit in with home
country pressures for CSR, but rather because they are more
profit motivated than local firms and see an opportunity to
partially lower their costs. A systematic comparison of labor
costs between disabled and non-disabled workers should be
provided in future research. Second, we fail to provide evidence
for institutional diffusion from MNC subsidiaries to local firms in
emerging markets (hypothesis 3). This result may be partially
because domestic firms are under stronger institutional
pressures from domestic business communities than from MNC
subsidiaries in Korea. The result for control variables in model 2
shows that management associations and benchmarking
activities have a negative influence on hiring disabled employees.
Another possible reason may lie in limitation of the data source.
The data for analysis come from 2004 Enterprise Panel Survey
that is cross-sectional rather than longitudinal. Therefore, it is
difficult to observe changes in the MNC dominance in a
particular industry and reactions of domestic firms to the
changes. Future research using longitudinal data sources will be
fruitful. 
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